Defaulted Venezuelan bonds have rallied from 30 cents to 40 in anticipation of some kind of debt restructuring since the US captured President Nicolás Maduro on 3 January and left his vice president in charge.

So far, Donald Trump and his administration have talked a lot about the country's oil, but haven't outlined plans for Venezuela's defaulted debts, totalling at least $150bn or over 200% of gross domestic product. The country stopped making payments in late 2017 as it entered hyperinflation.

Here are 11 considerations for the potential debt restructuring.

1. Bondholders shouldn't be this excited
Taken at his word, Trump wants to triple or quadruple Venezuelan oil production, which will require something like $100bn in investment over at least a decade. Creditors owed money by Venezuela are largely an obstacle to this mission. They want a massive payout from the only industry that generates dollars in exchange for (basically) nothing. Most creditors have no oil expertise and can't help the industry recover – they just want to get paid.

As such, current bond prices seem totally unreasonable. A debt workout where junior creditors got 40-50 cents on the dollar (via new bonds) and senior creditors got even more would saddle Venezuela and its oil company PDVSA with massive principal and interest payments that would divert a mountain of money away from oil investment and the country's reconstruction. Why would Trump want that? Venezuela might regain access to capital markets if all goes well, but is that worth the $60bn-$100bn in 'recovery value' creditors are seeking? No.

2. Early signs suggest Trump will just ignore creditors
In his big meeting with oil executives on 9 January, Trump told ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil (who are owed around $14bn in total from Hugo Chávez-era expropriations) that the US was starting with a clean slate, and that they should 'write off' their debts if they aren't willing to invest in Venezuela.

In a similar vein, Trump signed an executive order that protects Venezuela's oil revenue from being seized by creditors trying to get paid, undercutting any leverage that creditors might have gained from Maduro's ouster. (Venezuela's oil exports and revenues are now wholly managed by the US and are landing in a Qatar escrow that the Treasury manages at its discretion).

3. The US can delay debt restructuring indefinitely
Venezuela, PDVSA and a number of related entities are still under sanctions imposed by the Trump and Joe Biden administrations that make a restructuring impossible. As a result, the US government can threaten to leave creditors in financial limbo unless they accept a debt exchange with large haircuts that leaves Venezuela and PDVSA with manageable payments.

Beyond sanctions and sanctions relief, because most of Venezuela's debt is New York-law debt contracts and other claims in the American legal system, the US generally has significant leverage in any negotiation. Iraq's 2006 debt restructuring shows just how much the US can help sovereign debtors.